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In the
Supreme Court of the State of Utah
HEBER W. GLENN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No. 8780

RENA S. PLAYER, sometimes
known as SERENA PLAYER,
Defendant a.nd Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff commenced this action directing his
remedy to the equitable side of the court and requested
that a contract, which had been entered into over fourteen years prior to the date of the filing of the complaint,
be ordered specifically performed. The lower court justly
refused to grant the request of the plaintiff and entered
its judgment in favor of the defendant after a full trial
on the merits.
We do not wish to burden the Court with a lengthy
recital of the facts, but opposing counsel has only recited
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the record on controverted facts in the light most favorable to his case and has thereby ignored the oft-repeated
rule that the judgment of the lower court will not be disturbed if supported by any substantial evidence.
On the 11th day of February, 1942, C. F. Player was
the owner in fee of a parcel of real property located in
Salt Lake County. (Ex. 8) C. F. Player, on the date aforesaid, was the husband of the defendant, Rena S. Player.
O·n February 11, 1942, the defendant and her husband entered into a sales contract with the plaintiff to sell
to the plaintiff the real property which is the subject
matter of this proceeding. (Ex. 3) This contract was
written by the plaintiff's agent. (T 66) At that time the
plaintiff paid to the defendant and her husband the agreed
down payment of one-thousand dollars and, as recited
in the contract, he agreed to pay six hundred dollars on
May 11, 1942, and the balance on August 11, 1942. (Ex.
3) At no time did the defendant or her now deceased
husband receive the subsequent payments agreed to be
paid by the plaintiff under the provisions of the contract.
(T 47) And at no time prior to March 26, 1956, did the
plaintiff, Mr. Glenn, contact the defendant to pay her for
the p·roperty. (T 47)
The contract recites that taxes would be pro-rated to
the date of possession, but the defendant's deceased husband during his life, or the defendant, have discharged
the property tax obligation since the contract was entered
into. (T 34) The plaintiff has at no time paid the
property taxes (T 42) and he has never offered to reimburse the defendant for these taxes. (T 49)
Shortly after the contract was signed, the plaintiff
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removed approximately one hundred yards of gravel
from the property. (T 37) The court has found from the
record that the plaintiff relinquished possession on August
11, 1942, and has not been in possession of the property,
nor has he removed gravel, in any of the intervening fourteen years. (T 73) It is well to note here also that for the
fifteen year period between August 11, 1942, and the date
of the trial, Mrs. Player's son has farmed the property and
Mrs. Player or her deceased husband were at all times in
possession by reason thereof. (T 57)
As heretofore stated, the defendant's now deceased
husband owned the subject property in fee during his lifetime. (Ex. 8) The only interest to the date of death of
the husband, held by the defendant, was her inchoate
statutory interest. (Ex. 8) She has taken title to the said
property after electing to relinquish her statutory interest,
through the testamentary provisions of her deceased hus.band's will which was probated in Salt Lake County. (Ex.
8) The probate record was before the trial court in this
matter, and that file disclosed, and the court here found,
that Heber Glenn, the plaintiff, did not :file a claim for a
refund or for a debt due in the probate proceeding nor did
he request the court or the executrix to specifically perform the contract which is the subject of this case. (T 4873).
In this regard, it is well to note, that the plaintiff
waited until five years after the death of C. F. Player, the
real owner of the property, to bring his action. By reason
thereof, the defendant was placed at serious disadvantage
to cope with the claims of the plaintiff.
Exhibits 6 and 7 show that on March 19, 1953, defendant entered into binding options to sell the said real

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

property to the State Road Commission. In addition, on
March 9, 1956, the plaintiff, by warranty deed, conveyed
a portion of the premises to Gibbons and Reed Company.
(Ex. 8)
The first notice of the plaintiff's claim during the
fifteen year period which the defendant, Mrs. Player, received was subsequent to the above conveyances and was
in the form of a letter mailed March 28, 1956, written by
opposing counsel to her directing her to make conveyance
of the property. (Ex. 5 and T 47) This was fourteen
years after the contract was signed-thirteen and a half
years after the plaintiff was supposed to have made the
final payment on the contract-five years after the death
of C. F. Player-two and a half years after the estate of
C. F. Player was closed-three years after the defendant
was placed in an inextricable position through the options
to the State Road Commission-and subsequent to the
time the defendant had warranted a portion of said premises to a third party.
It is also well to note that Mr. Glenn fully realized
the substantial increase in value real property enjoyed
during all of the fourteen years he was silent. (T 44)
Some weight has been attached by counsel to the
provision set forth in the contract of February 11, 1942,
wherein Mr. Glenn was given an option to take title to a
portion of the property after certain amounts were paid
in. Significantly, this record is completely absent of any
testimony or exhibit wherein Mr. Glenn attempted to
exercise any such option. His only contact to the defendant was by letter of March 28, 1956, in which his
counsel requested a conveyance of the entire parcel.
The plaintiff has set forth certain facts in a manner
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which would lead one to believe are uncontroverted in the
record. May we direct the Court's attention to Page 2 of
plaintiff's Brief wherein the second full paragraph recites
that the plaintiff offered the sellers the balance of the purchase price on May 10, 1942. Transcript Page 47 shows
that when the defendant, Mrs. Player, was asked if the
plaintiff ever offered her the payments on the contract she
replied t(No, Sir."
Again, the second full Paragraph on Page 3 recites
that the plaintiff made other visits to settle the matter
with the defendant. Her testimony, however, is to the
effe.ct that she never saw the plaintiff after the contract
was executed until the day of trial. (T 46-47)
Based upon the foregoing facts, the Court properly
refused the equitable remedy requested and entered judgment in favor of the defendant. From this judgment, the
plaintiff has appealed.
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT NO. I.
THE PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM MAINT AINING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE BY REASON
OF HIS LACHES IN REQUESTING EQUITABLE RELIEF.
a. A Fourteen Year Delay In Bringing An Action In
Equity Will Bar The Plaintiff From Receiving
Equitable Relief.
b. The Plaintiff Is Barred From Receiving Equitable
Relief By Reason Of The Statute Of Limitations.
POINT NO. II.
THE PLAINTIFF HAS ABANDONED, FORFEITED
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AND RELINQUISHED HIS RIGHTS IN THE CONTRACT AND THE PROPERTY.
POINT NO. III.
THE PLAINTIFF WAIVED HIS RIGHTS UNDER
THE CONTRACT BY NOT FILING A CLAIM OR
DEMAND FOR PERFORMANCE IN THE PROBATE
PROCEEDINGS OF C. F. PLAYER.
POINT NO. IV.
THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PORTION OF THE PROPERTY BECAUSE HE FAILED
TO EXERCISE THE OPTION IN THE CONTRACT.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
POINT I.
THE PLAINTIFF IS ESTOPPED FROM MAINTAINING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE BY REASON OF HIS
LACHES IN REQUESTING EQUITABLE RELIEF.
a. A Fourteen Year Delay In Bringing An Action In
Equity Will Bar The Plaintiff From Receiving
Equitable Relief.
The facts in this case, as found by the Court and as
shown by the evidence, are to the effect that the plaintiff
entered into the possession of the real property -we are here
concerned with on February 11, 1942, and he remained
in possession until August 11, 1942, upon which date he
relinquished possession and was not seen by the defendant
again until the morning of the trial of this action. The
plaintiff demanded a deed be delivered to him in May,
1942, but such a deed was not delivered at that time nor
has one been delivered since. Substantial testimony was
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elicited from Mrs. Player and LeRoy Player all to the
effect that after the defendant relinquished possession of
the premises, he was not seen again until the morning of
the trial.
The first word after 1942 that was received by the
defendant which indicated plaintiff was asserting an interest in the property was the letter sent by plaintiff's
counsel to the defendant in the latter part of March, 1956.
This was fourteen years subsequent to the execution of
the contract and 13 Yz years after the defendant should
have paid for the property and 13 Yz years after the plaintiff requested a deed. In other words, if plaintiff has ever
had a cause of action, it arose 13 Yz years prior to his letter
of March, 1956, and over fourteen years prior to the date
upon which he :filed his complaint applying for equitable
assistance.
What has happened during this period of time? First,
after the property was distributed to the defendant at the
close of the probate of her husband's estate, she entered
into two options with the State Road Commission, the
first of which pertaining to eight acres of the property is
probably enforceable either in an equitable proceeding or
through an action for damages. Second, Mrs. Player
has conveyed a portion of the premises by warranty deed
to Gibbons and Reed Company. It is true that Gibbons
and Reed have had notice of the claims of the plaintiff,
but, nevertheless, damages would certainly be assessed
against Mrs. Player if Gibbons and Reed were evicted by
the plaintiff.
Consequently, the climate here is such that the fourteen year delay in enforcing any alleged right has worked
to the serious prejudice of Mrs. Player, the defendant.
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Such prejudice has arisen solely by Mr. Glenn's delay and
must bear the label of ((laches" as against the plaintiff.

In Dewitt vs. Old Town Bank, 85 Md. 315, 37 A. 266,
60 Am. St. Rep. 322, laches was defined by Chief Judge
McSherry, as follows:
((Strictly speaking, and using the term as it is
understood in the law, laches is such neglect or
omission to assert a right as, taken in conjunction
with lapse of time more or less great, and other
circumstances causing prejudice to an adverse
party, operates as a bar in a .court of equity."
Professor Pomeroy in Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 4,
Sec. 1140, states:
((Laches, in legal significance, is not more delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to another. So long as parties are in the same condition,
it matters little whether one presses a right promptly or slowly, within limits allowed by law; but
when, knowing his rights, he takes no step to enforce them until the condition of the party, has, in
good faith, beco1ne so changed that he cannot be
restored to his former state, if the right be then
enforced, delay beco1nes inequitable and operates
as estoppel against the assertion of the right."
The defendant's position here has been further prejudiced and impaired by other events which have occurred
since the execution of the contract and which have been
considered as significant to denying the relief of specific
performance in other courts and by the text writers on
the subject. For instance, C. F. Player, the primary seller
and the person the plaintiff claims to have talked with,
died five years prior to the time this action was commenced
and nine years after the plaintiff requested a deed. 'Qte
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prejudice which is worked by reason of the decease of
C. F. Player is certainly subject to speculation but it is not
difficult to imagine that Mr. Player, if alive, could shed
much light on the facts in the case. By reason thereof,
absence of his testimony would certainly make the imposition of an equitable order subject to great doubt. Further,
the defendant, Mrs. Player, elected to take under the provisions of her husband's will rather than under her statutory widow's interest. How much her election was influenced by the long delay in asserting any rights by Mr.
Glenn is again subject to some speculation, but it would
appear reasonable to believe that the relinquishment and
abandonment of the property and contract by Mr. Glenn
entered into her decision to take under the terms of her
husband's will. In regard to the foregoing, this Court, in
Jones Mining Company vs. Cardiff Mining and Mill Company, 56 U 449, 191 Pacific 426, adopted the general doctrine stated in 19 R. S. C. 142, Page 39 5, which is as
follows:
((It is a familiar doctrine that, apart from any
question of statutory limitation, courts of equity
will discourage laches and delay in the en for cement
of righ~ts. The general principle is that nothing can
call forth the court of chancery into activity but
conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence.
Where those are wanting, the court is passive and
does nothing. The doctrine is founded principally
on the equity maxims, (he who seeks equity must
do equity,' (he who comes into equity must come
with .clean hands,' and (the laws serve the vigilant,
and not those who sleep over their rights,' and is
based on considerations of public policy. Its object is in general to exact of the complainant fair
dealing with his adversary, and the rule was adopted
largely because after great length of time, from
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death of parties, loss of papers, deatk ?f witnesses,
change· of titles, intervention of equities, or other
causes there is danger of doing injustice, and there
can be no longer a safe determination of the controversy." (Emphasis supplied.)
Worthy of consideration is an additional fact supporting laches which developed during the long interval between the date of the contract and the date of the
commencement of this action-that is the substantial increase in market value of this property. It seems evident
to us that a person should not be permitted to sit back
comfortably on his alleged rights during a fourteen year
period of advancing values without making any effort to
occupy the property, pay taxes as they accrue or evidence
any interest in the property, and then, when a profit is
assured, solicit the assistance of an equitable tribunal to
insure his gains. It was interesting for us to note that this
Court, in a fact situation involving a price decline over a
mere three year period, affirmed a finding of laches as a
bar to equitable relief. See Olson vs. Gaddis Investment
Co., et al., 85 U 430. 39 Pac. 2d 744.
It therefore appears that specific performance was
here properly denied. The plaintiff did nothing to enforce
his rights after relinquishing his possession of the property
for fourteen years. In the interim, C. F. Player died and
the property passed through his estate to Mrs. Player, the
defendant, who, thereafter, made options and conveyances
which would, if upset now, expose her to lawsuits and
damages completely out of proportion to any supposed
benefits running to the plaintiff.
Under these circumstances the laches of the plaintiff
falls squarely within the above announced rules and the
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plaintiff must be adjudged to be estopped from receiving
the equitable remedy prayed for.
b. The Plaintiff Is Barred From Re.ceiving Equitable
Relief By Reason Of The Statute Of Limitations.
The plaintiff requested a deed to the real property and
relinquished possession of the premises during the year
1942. It was therefore during the year 1942 that the
plaintiff's cause of action accrued if he has ever possessed
a cause of action. He waited until October, 1956, to file
his complaint. The record is completely silent on any facts
which would toll the running of the statute of limitations.

Sections 78-12-23, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states
that:
uWithin six years: (after accrual of a cause
of a.ction)

* * * * * * *
(2) An Action upon any contract, obligation
or liability founded upon an instrument in writing
____________________ " (must be commenced.)

It seems superfluous to state that the plaintiff brought
his action on a written contract; that his cause of action
accrued in 1942; and that he has not brought his action
within six years as the statute requires.
It also seems superfluous to state that the statute is
not limited in its application to matters arising at law but
the general language also encompasses actions in equity.
Although there appears to be no direct case on this subject
in Utah, this Court's language in Smith vs. Smith, 77 U 60,
291 Pac. 298, indicates this Court's acceptance of the application of the statute to equitable matters. In an earlier
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case, wherein the plaintiff was attempting, through equity,
to impress a transaction with a trust, this Court stated:
((There is therefore no question of an express
trust in this case, and the statute of limitations is
applicable here precisely as in any other fiduciary
relations out of which constructive or implied
trusts arise. In all such cases the statute begins to
run from the time that the complaining party discovered the wrongs complained of or when he was
apprised of such facts and circumstances with respect thereto as would put a person of ordinary
intelligence and prudence upon inquiry. The law
is stated to that effect by this court in the case of
Gibson vs. Jensen, 48 Utah, 248, 158 Pac. 426, and
in Salt Lake City vs. Investment Co., 43 Utah, 181,
134 Pac. 603. If therefore the facts and circumstances which came to the knowledge of the plaintiff corporation were such as would have caused a
person of ordinary prudence and intelligence to act,
then it should have acted, and the statute of limitations was set in motion as to it. This is so quite
apart from the doctrine of laches which is always
an important element in actions like the one at bar
and which is relied on by defendants."
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Thompson vs. Rosehill Burial Park, et al, 60 Pac. 2d 756, in discussing the application of the statute of limitations to an action for
specific performance stated:
ttThe action is of equitable cognizance, and
the defendants have pleaded the statute of limitations. The trial court held that the statute of
limitations interposed by the defendants was applicable and rendered judgment for the defendant.
Actions for specific performance of a contract to
convey an interest in real estate, unless there is
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fraud or unusual circumstances, would justify the
suspense of the application of the statute of limitations ________________________________ , must be brought within
five years. See Wilson vs. Bombeck, 3 8 Oklahoma
49 8, 13 4 Pac. 3 8 2 ; Hurst et al, vs. Hannah et al,
207 Oklahoma 3, 229 Pac. 163."
Kentucky has announced the same rule. See Knapp et
J.l vs. Read, 21 S.W. 2nd 705. See also Church et al, vs.
Winton et al, 46 Atlantic 363 and Pepper et al, vs. Truitt
et. al., (CCA 10), 158 Federal 2d 250.
It seems to us, therefore, the plaintiff's cause of action
is directly barred by the statute of limitations.
POINT II.
THE PLAINTIFF HAS ABANDONED, FORFEITED
AND RELINQUISHED HIS RIGHTS IN THE CONTRACT AND THE PROPERTY.

1

As found by the trial court, the plaintiff entered into
possession of the property at the time the contract was
executed in February of 1942. He immediately commenced the removal of gravel and remained in possession
until the final payment was due on the contract. The
trial court further found that in August, 1942, the plaintiff relinquished possession of the property and has not
been in possession nor has he removed gravel since that
date.
On the other hand, the defendant, through her son,
managed the property and farmed it each of the intervening fourteen years. The possession of the property by
the defendant during this entire period has been open and
exclusive.
These facts can lead to only one reasonable conclu-
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sion, that is, that the plaintiff in the year 1942 intended
to abandon the property and in pursuance of this intent,
relinquished possession of the property. In addition, he
paid no payments for taxes or otherwise and remained
indicatively silent for fourteen years.
These facts are very clear and persuasive that the
plaintiff abandoned the property and his rights in the
contract.
In Glatzer vs. Keyes, 125 Conn. 227, 5 A. 2d 1, the
Connecticut Court made a scholarly summation of the rule
of abandonment, and in so doing, stated:
((To constitute an abandonment there must be
an intention to abandon or relinquish accompanied
by some act or omission to act by which such intention is manifested. Stevens vs. Norfolk, 42
Conn. 377, 3 84: Collins vs. Lewis, 111 Conn. 299,
303, 149 A. 668; 1 C.J.S., Abandonment, p. 8,
par. 3. While mere nonuse and lapse of time alone
are not enough to constitute abandonment, they
are competent evidence of an intent to abandon,
and as such may be entitled to great weight when
considered with any other circumstances, and
abandonment may be inferred from circumstances,
such as failure by acts or otherwise to assert any
claim to the right alleged to have been abandoned,
or may be presumed from long continued neglect
New York, N.H. & H.R. Co. vs. Cella, supra, page
522, 91 A. 972; Town of Derby vs. Alling, 40
Conn, 41 0, 4 3 6; 1 Am. J ur. p. II ; Keane vs. Canno van, 21 Cal. 29I, 303, 82 Am. Dec. 738-. Most
frequently, where abandonment has been held established, there has been found present some af-

firma.tive act indicative of an intention to abandon,
as in Peck vs. Lee, supra, page 377, 148 A. 133,
where it was found that the mortgagee had de-
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stroyed the mortgage and the note which it secured,
but nonuser, as of an easement, or oth,er negative
or passive conduct nttay be sufficient to signify the

requisite intention and justify a conclusion of abandonment. The weight and effect of such conduct
depends not only upon its duration but also upon
its character and the accompanying circumstances.
Raritan Water-Power Co. vs. Veghte, 21 N.J. Eq.
463, 480. McArthur vs. Morgan, 49 Conn, 347,
3 SO, sustained a finding as a fact that a right to use
water power of a stream in connection with a mill
site, as to wbich there had been for eighl years no

manifestation of an intent to utilize it, had been
abandoned. See, also, Banks vs. Judah, 8 Conn.
145, 161." (Emphasis supplied)
Text writers have announced:
((In the absence of a default of one party which
gives the other party a right to elect to rescind,
unless a land contract is voidable when made, for
fraud, mistake, duress, undue influence, infancy,
mental incompetency, etc., the same principle
which requires the assent of both parties to the
making of the .contract of sale ordinarily requires
the assent of both parties to its change or extinguishment. It is, however, competent for the
parties, as in case of other contracts, to change or
extinguish a con tract of sale of real property by
subsequent mutual assent. A mutual agreement
to rescind may be found if, after breach or abandonment by one party, the other by word or act
declares the contract rescinded. It has been said

that no mode of terminating the equitable interest
of the purchaser can be more perfect than a voluntary relinquishment by him of all rights under the
contract, and a voluntary surrender of the possession to the vendor." See 55 Am. fur. P. 579. (Emphasis supplied)
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In addition, this Court, in an action pertaining to the
surrender of an option, has announced approval of the
rule in 18 Am. and Bug. Enc. L. 362, which reads:

((An actual and continued change of possession by the mutual consent of the parties will operate as a surrender by operation of law, though
there was no express agreement of the parties that
it should so operate." See K. P. Mining Co. vs.
Jacobsen, 32 U 115, 83 Pac. 728.
Based upon the facts here found by the trial court,
it is manifest that an abandonment has been executed and
that by reason thereof, plaintiff has relinquished all of his
rights in the property and the contract.
POINT III.
THE PLAINTIFF WAIVED HIS RIGHTS UNDER
THE CONTRACT BY NOT FILING A CLAIM OR
DEMAND FOR PERFORMANCE IN THE PROBATE
PROCEEDING OF C. F. PLAYER.
The fee owner of the real property in February, 1942,
was C. F. Player, the now deceased husband of the defendant. The defendant for the ensuing nine year period
was not a joint tenant nor a tenant in common with C. F.
Player and consequently had no direct affirmative interest
in the property. Her only interest in the premises, as a
matter of law, was her inchoate rights preserved to a widow
under the provisions of the Utah Statutes.
Therefore, in February, 1942, Mrs. Player was not in
the ordinary sense, a seller, for her inchoate interest by the
nature of things, was not capable of conveyance but only
release.
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That was all that she contracted to sell under the
agreement of February 11, 1942, for that was all she possessed. This seems self evident if we could reflect for a
moment on the nature of a proceding brought timely
under these same facts. If C. F. Player was not made a
party to an action brought during his life for specific performance, and only Mrs. Player were joined, what relief
could be obtained? Could the Court, under such circumstances, order Mrs. Player to convey? Obviously not.
This distinction and the nature of the .e state held by Mrs.
Player therefore comes into focus. She did not agree to
convey the property-because she couldn't have-she
didn't own it. Her husband was the person who owned
the property and is the person who would have had to
have made conveyance. Such was the status of the parties
to the date of C. F. Player's death.
Nine years after the date of the contract, in the probate proceeding, Mrs. Player elected to relinquish her
statutory right and to take the property pursuant to the
provisions of her husband's will.
Pertinent sections of the Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
rovide as follows:

Section 75-11-26:

((When a person, who is
bound by contract in writing to convey any real
estate or who is bound by contract in writing to
assign, transfer or deliver any personal property,
shares of capital stock, bonds or other choses in
action, dies before making the conveyance, assignment, transfer or delivery; and in ~11 cases when such
decedent, if living, might be compelled to make
such conveyance, assignment, transfer or delivery,
the court may make a decree authorizing and directing his executor or administrator to convey
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such real estate or to assign, transfer, or deliver
such persoanl ~roperty, shares of capital stock,
bonds or other choses in action, to the person entitled thereto."
Section 75-11-27: uon the presentation of a
verified petition by any person claiming to be entitled to such conveyance, assignment, transfer or
delivery from an executor or administrator, setting
forth the facts upon which the claim is predicated,
the court or clerk must appoint a time and place
for hearing the petition, which shall be upon notice."
Section 75-11-29: ((If upon a hearing as hereinbefore provided the right of the petitioner to
have a specific performance of the contract is found
to be doubtful, the court must dismiss the petition
without prejudice to the rights of the petitioner,
who may, at any time within six months thereafter,
proceed by action to enforce specific performance
thereof." (Emphasis supplied)
The foregoing statutory procedure provides the exclusive manner in which specific performance may be obtained in instances where a promisor has died. See Free vs.
Little, 31 U 449, 8 8 Pac. 407, P. 463. In the Free case,
this Court appropriately said:
((Appellants alleged in their answer, and it was
admitted at the trial, that respondent presented no
claim of any kind against the estate, nor did she in
any way comply, or attempt to comply, with sections 3935 to 3940, Revised Statutes 1898, inclusive. These sections contained special provisions
in respect to action for specific performance against
deceased persons. The writing in this case sought
to be enforced falls squarely within the provisions
of the sections above referred to. Waiving, therefore, the question as to whether a claim should have
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been presented under sections 3 8 60 to 3 87 4, Revised
Statutes 1898, which we think, in view of the provisions of section 39 3 5 et seq., above referred to.
Those latter sections are intended to meet the very
difficulties which have arisen in this, .case .... "
And in further explanation, it was announced:
((Suppose it developed that specific
performance should not be decreed, as is often the
case upon a full hearing, but that the claimant
had some right to damages, how are those damages
to be adjusted out of the estate if it has been fully
closed and final distribution has been made? If
the claim stood merely as a legal one, in view that it
never was presented as provided by law, it would
be fully barred and no relief could be granted.
Does it stand in a different light in equity un_der
the provisions of sections 3935 to 3940, inclusive
where no petition has ever been filed or claim made
in the probate court? We think not. These sections, when we view and .consider them, have the
same effect upon claims for specific performance
in requiring such claims to be brought to the attention of the probate court pending the administration of the estate that the preceding sections, have
upon other or purely legal claims. As to legal
claims, the right is barred absolutely unless they
are presented within the time fixed by these several
sections unless the cause pointed out by the statute
prevented presentation. This would be so whether
the claims were matured or not, contingent or
fixed. In claims for specific performance, we
P. 466:

think, and so hold, that, unless a petition is filed or
claim is made in a court for specific Performance
within the time limited to file other claims, the
claim for specific performance must be held to be
waived or abandoned, unless, as in other cases, good
cause is shown why it could not be· filed within the
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time allowed for claims to be filed." (Emphasis
supplied)
Here, it is not controverted that the plaintiff failed
to file any claim against the estate of C. F. Player and that
he also failed to file a petition for specific performance as
required by the foregoing sections. There seems to be
no question then that the relief requested would be denied
as a matter of statute if this property had passed to third
parties or if it were still held in the estate as an undistributed asset or if it had passed to the defendant without
her name appearing on the contract.
An inspection of the decree entered on P. 24 of Ex.
8 will disclose that claims against C. F. Player's estate were
required to be filed on or before the 1st day of April, 1953,
and that distribution of the assets of the estate thereafter
took place on May 6, 1953. In addition, no petition for
specific performance was ever interposed. Consequently,
and we quote again the language of the Free Case:
the claim for specific performance must
be waived or abandoned.... "
cc. • •

It should be recognized in this regard that during
probate, and considering that the decedent owned the
fee interest in the property, the executrix of the estate
held the entire interest in the property subject to the probate proceeding. It is of cardinal importance to note
also that the interest of Mrs. Player only arose after she
had made here election and only was perfected by way of
and upon distribution. She took nothing which she pos·
sessed and agreed to sell under the provisions of the con·
tract of February, 1942.
·
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Consequently, the trial court, if it had ordered specific performance of the contract would have ordered Mrs.
Player to convey something which she did not own and
could not have conveyed in February, 1942, or at any
time prior to distribution. Further, as a matter of statute
and law, the plaintiff's rights were waived and abandoned
by his failure to comply with the aforequoted statutory
se.ctions.
It necessarily follows that the result is not changed
because Mrs. Player signed the original contract.

POINT IV.
THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO A PO·RTIO·N OF THE PRO·PERTY BECAUSE HE FAILED
TO EXERCISE THE OPTIO·N IN THE CONTRACT.
The plaintiff argues under Point IV. of his brief that
he is entitled to a portion of the premises because the contract contained a covenant which provided that at his
option he could acquire title to one of the two tracts in. volved after he had paid a certain sum. There is no question that enough money was paid to enable the plaintiff
, to exercise his option and a.cquire the smaller parcel, but
: the mere existance of such an option does not compel the
· conveyance. Certain acts must be done to perfect the
., right such as notice of the election and request for the
: deed and an entry as provided in the contract.
It seems patently clear from this record that such an
.election was never made and that any rights under the
~covenant have been waived and abandoned in addition to
~being barred by the statutes hereinabove set forth. Of
further significance is the failure of the plaintiff to intro-
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duce one fact which would support a finding that the
plaintiff had exercised the option.
This point raised by the plaintiff lacks legal significance in this review.

CONCLUSION
The cases cited by the respective parties in this proceeding do not appear to evidence any conflicting doctrines which could be urged to this Court. In fact, the
general principles announced are quite uniform in the
various jurisdictions. We believe the record in this case is
substantial in support of the judgment of the lower Court.
Equity jurisprudence has historically been vested in
the sound discretion of the chancellor and, with his opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses and the
parties, their frankness and candor, he is better able to
justly grant or refuse equitable relief. Accordingly, the
judgment of the lower Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER,
C. PRESTON ALLEN and
W. DOUGLAS ALLEN
Attorneys for Respondent.
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